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TOPIC V.B.1. 
PAUL MARCUS 
The Exclusion of Evidence in the United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Exclusion of evidence in criminal cases in the United States has 
been a topic of much debate since the early part of this century. The 
United States Supreme Court, in 1914, held that in a federal prose- 
cution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence which had 
been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. In the case of 
Weeks v. United States' the Court was interpreting the language of 
the Fourth Amendment to the American Constitution which pro- 
vides in material part: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause . . . ." The Supreme Court in the Weeks case 
was interpreting the Fourth Amendment to apply in federal cases. 
The debate over the exclusion of evidence intensified in the 
1960s with the opinions by the United States Supreme Court in 
Mapp v. Ohio2 and Miranda v. Arizona.3 In those cases the Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment provision regarding unlawful 
searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment provision relating 
to thie privilege against self-incrimination applied to state criminal 
actions. These provisions were construed so as to exclude in state 
prosecutions evidence which had been unlawfully obtained. The ra- 
tionale for these holdings was stated by the Court: "Conviction by 
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions .... should 
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts4.... [and] that such 
evidence 'shall not be used at all.' "5 
As we shall see, the debate regarding the exclusion of evidence 
continues to rage throughout the United States. Before turning to 
that debate, and the policy considerations underlying it, it is impor- 
PAUL MARCUS is Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. 
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4. 232 U.S. at 392. 
5. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) [opinion of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes]. 
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tant to look to the various sources for the exclusionary rule found 
throughtout the country. 
II. SOURCES FOR EXCLUSION 
The exclusionary rule in the United States, simply put, means 
that if government agents have obtained evidence in an unlawful 
fashion, that evidence will be excluded at the criminal defendant's 
trial. Numerous judges have commented that there are two pur- 
poses for this rule of exclusion, referring to "the twin goals of en- 
abling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnerships in official 
lawlessness and of assuring the people .... that the government 
would not profit from it lawless behavior ...."6 Three different 
sources exist for the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases: the su- 
pervisory power of judges over criminal cases, state statutes and con- 
stitutions, and federal constitutional provisions. 
A. Judicial Supervisory Powers 
The United States Supreme Court in the Weeks case was inter- 
preting the Fourth Amendment in a case in which criminal prosecu- 
tions were brought in federal courts under the supervision of federal 
judges, most especially the United States Supreme Court Justices. 
As pointed out by Justice Harlan, such a situation is considerably 
different from applying Fourth Amendment exclusion rules to state 
prosecutions.7 As he noted in his dissent in the Mapp case: "Our 
role in promulgating the Weeks rule and its extensions ... was quite 
a different one than it is here. There, in implementing the Fourth 
Amendment, we occupied the position of a tribunal having the ulti- 
mate responsibility for developing the standards and procedures of 
judicial administration within the judicial system over which it 
presides."8 
Such a practice by judges is not at all unusual in the United 
States. Both federal and state courts regularly provide rules for the 
litigation of both civil and criminal cases, including very specific 
rules regarding timing for filings, evidentiary considerations, and the 
impaneling of juries.9 
B. State Statutes and Constitutional Procedures 
States have been quite active in providing their own exclusion 
remedies for criminal defendants in state prosecutions. Little of the 
6. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7. See ? II. C, infra. 
8. 367 U.S. at 682. 
9. The notion of a judicial supervisory power is discussed in People v. Cipriano, 
429 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. 1988). 
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activity, however, is found in legislative statutes calling for exclu- 
sion. This Minnesota statute, for example, is unusual. 
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may 
move the district court for the district in which the prop- 
erty was seized ... for the return of the property and to 
suppress the use, as evidence, of anything so obtained."'0 
Most of the state activity, instead, has been centered in analyses 
of various state constitutional provisions. In a host of different ar- 
eas, parallel state constitutional provisions have been interpreted by 
state courts to provide greater protection for criminal defendants 
than the federal counterparts. In short, in several areas the defend- 
ant is more likely to have evidence excluded under state constitu- 
tional law than under federal constitutional law. "The federal 
constitution establishes minimum rather than maximum guarantees 
of individual rights, and the state courts independently determine, 
according to their own law (generally their own state constitutions), 
the nature of the protection of the individual against state govern- 
ment."" To demonstrate both the impact of this application of state 
constitutional law, and the important changes in the area, we shall 
look to recent cases from three different states. 
In State v. Novembrino12 the New Jersey Supreme Court de- 
cided to reject the United States Supreme Court's exception to the 
exclusionary rule for searches in good faith conducted pursuant to 
warrants.'3 Instead, the court remarked that state constitutional 
provisions may be a source "of individual liberties more expansive 
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.'4 Though the lan- 
guage of the New Jersey constitution was "virtually identical" to 
that of the federal fourth amendment, the court expressly rejected 
the United States Supreme Court view on this so-called good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. 
[S]uch a rule would tend to undermine the constitutionally- 
guaranteed standard of probable cause, and in the process 
disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by our 
10. Minnesota Stat. ? 626.21 (1986). 
11. Abrahamson, "Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of 
State Constitutional Law," 63 Texas L. Rev. 1141, 1153 (1985) [the author is a Justice 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.] See also, the statement of Justice Stein of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court: "Because a state constitution may afford enhanced pro- 
tection for individual liberties, we 'should not uncritically adopt federal constitu- 
tional interpretations for the New Jersey Constitution merely for the sake of 
consistency.'" State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 99, 519 A.2d 820, 823 (1987). 
12. Id. 
13. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984) found that evidence which had been obtained as a result of a search would not 
be excluded if the police officer reasonably and in good faith relied upon a warrant 
which later turned out to be defective. 
14. 105 N.J. at 124, 519 A.2d at 849. 
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criminal justice system to accommodate that constitutional 
guarantee without impairing law enforcement.'5 
California also has applied its state constitution to exclude evi- 
dence which would not necessarily be excluded in federal criminal 
cases. The court in People v. Houston'6 rejected a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court under the Fifth and Sixth Amend- 
ments in which the Court had held that it was no violation of consti- 
tutional rights for government officers to conceal from the 
defendant the fact that his attorney was attempting to reach him at 
the police station so long as the attorney was not physically present 
there.'7 The California Supreme Court found that the "state char- 
ters offer important local protection against the ebbs and flows of 
federal constitutional interpretation.'8 The court made clear that 
exclusion was required under the state constitution even though the 
United States Constitution reached a different result.'9 
Finally, the most striking use of a state rule of exclusion may be 
the Massachusetts doctrine established in Commonwealth v. Blood.20 
There the issue concerned the common "one party consent" case in 
which an informer is "wired" for sound and then engages in a tape 
recorded conversation with the defendant. The conversation is ulti- 
mately used against the defendant because it contains her incrimi- 
nating remarks. The United States Supreme Court has found that 
such activity is not affected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because one of the two parties to the con- 
versation consented to its being recorded.2' The Massachusetts 
court looked to its own state Declaration of Rights and found that 
while the language there was similar to that of the United States 
Constitution the rule of exclusion would be quite different. 
15. 105 N.J. at 132, 519 A.2d at 857. See also State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 
674 (South Dakota 1976) where the state court rejected the United States Supreme 
Court's decision regarding inventory searches of automobiles. 
16. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986). 
17. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
18. 42 Cal. 3d at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 148. 
19. "The debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1849 made quite clear 
that the language of the Declaration of Rights which comprises Article I of 
the California Constitution was not based upon the federal charter at all, 
but upon the constitutions of other states. When the 1849 Constitution was 
adopted, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitutional 
rights have been applied to the states, did not yet exist. Indeed, a reading of 
both the 1849 and 1878 constitutional debates reflects a common understand- 
ing that it was the state Constitution, and not the federal, which would pro- 
tect the rights of California citizens against arbitrary action by the state." 
42 Cal. 3d at 609 n. 13, 724 P.2d at 1174 n. 13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n. 13 (emphasis in 
original). But see, People v. Ledesma, 251 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Cal. 1988). 
20. 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987). 
21. See generally, United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
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It is not just the right to a silent, solitary autonomy which is 
threatened by electronic surveillance: It is the right to 
bring thoughts and emotions forth from the self in company 
with others doing likewise, the right to be known to others 
and to know them, and thus to be whole as a free member 
of a free society.22 
C. Federal Constitutional Provisions 
Under the United States Constitution, two major areas of exclu- 
sion have been the focus of judicial interpretation. These relate to 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self- 
incrimination.23 
The landmark Fourth Amendment case applying the rule of ex- 
clusion in both state and federal actions is Mapp v. Ohio.24 The 
Court recognized that it had previously found that "in a prosecution 
in a State court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable 
search and seizure."25 In Mapp, however, the Court concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did incorporate the 
Fourth Amendment rules in state actions, including the rule of ex- 
clusion. The majority of the Court was deeply troubled by a sense 
that without exclusion of evidence, constitutional rights could not be 
protected due to the "obvious futility of relegating the Fourth 
Amendment to the protection of other remedies.26 
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State 
tends to destroy the entire system fo constitutional re- 
22. 400 Mass. at 69, 507 N.E.2d at 1034. In several American states, constitutional 
amendments have been passed which restrict the ability of state courts to take in- 
dependent roles regarding the exclusion of evidence. See, Abrahamson, supra note 
11, at 1154. 
23. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel also plays a role in this area. The 
seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) applied the Sixth Amend- 
ment right to counsel to state criminal actions in addition to federal prosecution. 
The major Sixth Amendment exclusion case involves police interrogation. In Mas- 
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) the defendant was formally indicted for vio- 
lating federal narcotics laws. He retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty and was 
released on bail. Thereafter an undercover police officer, "succeeded by surrepti- 
tious means" in receiving incriminating statements by the defendant. Id. at 201. The 
Court found that such questioning, after the defendant had been charged, violated 
his right to have an attorney present during all critical stages of the prosecution. 
The statement of the defendant, though reliable and not coerced, was excluded be- 
cause "the Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a 
trial surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the po- 
lice in a completely extrajudicial proceeding." Id. at 204. 
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
25. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
26. 367 U.S. at 652. 
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straints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having 
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and 
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy 
by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we 
can no longer permit that right to remain an empty prom- 
ise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to 
like affect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process 
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the 
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforce- 
ment itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decis- 
wion, founded on reason and truth, gives to an individual no 
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to 
the police officer no less than that to which honest law en- 
forcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integ- 
rity so necessary in the true administration of justice.27 
The exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court 
in Mapp covering unreasonable searches and seizures was the sub- 
ject of tremendous criticism at the time,28 such criticism has not 
abated in the thirty years since the decision was rendered. Indeed, 
over this thirty year period, several decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court have been rendered which have limited the reach of 
the exclusionary rule of Mapp.29 Still, the basic Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule put forth by a majority of the United States 
Supreme Court Justices in the Mapp case remains the law in the 
United States today. 
Perhaps the most controversial application of the exclusionary 
rule is that found in the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona.30 There the Supreme Court took several ac- 
tions which infuriated its critics.31 The Court found that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was to be applied 
27. Id. at 660. 
28. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whitaker, dissented in 
Mapp. He complained that the exclusion rule was poor policy; he was particularly 
concerned that the federal courts were imposing rigid rules in fifty different state 
jurisdictions. See, discussion in ? IV, infra. 
29. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) where the United States 
Supreme Court imposed severe restrictions on those who could raise Fourth Amend- 
ment claims under the doctrine of "standing". The question, according the Court in 
Rakas, was not whether evidence has been unlawfully obtained, but rather whether 
the individual petitioner "could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were 
the subject of the search and seizure." Id. at 149. Other restrictions, such as the 
good faith exception, harmless error, and the doctrine of retroactivity, are discussed 
in ? III. B, infra. 
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
31. Perhaps the sharpest of the critics were the dissenting Justices, Harlan, 
Stewart and White, who complained that the decision "represents poor constitu- 
tional law and entails harmful consequences for the country at large." Id. at 504. 
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against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2 Then the Court, through Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
found that the privilege would not be satisfied in the usual police 
setting33 unless the defendant was specifically warned of the right to 
remain silent, the right to have an attorney present, and the fact 
that anything said by the defendant would be used against him at 
trial.34 What made the opinion more striking, and more powerful, 
was that the Court found that if the warnings were not given exclu- 
sion was the proper remedy because the prosecution could not use 
the defendant's statements against him at trial to prove his guilt.35 
The Miranda decision continues to be debated even today.36 
Moreover, some severe limitations have been imposed on the hold- 
ing of Miranda including the government's ability to use the confes- 
sion for purposes of impeachment when the defendant testifies at 
trial,37 and the inapplicability of Miranda to situations in which the 
interrogation by the officers is not for reasons of receiving incrimi- 
nating information but rather to protect the public.38 In spite of 
these limitations and protests, Miranda remains the law today; an 
exclusion in the Fifth Amendment context will be used in the pre- 
trial police interrogation setting and in different settings as well.39 
The dissenters referred to the Court's holding as a "new constitutional code of rules 
for confessions." Id. 
32. The Court had actually applied the Fifth Amendment privilege against the 
states in an earlier case, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
33. Miranda applies where the defendant makes statements in response to inter- 
rogation by police officers given while she is held in custody. 
34. "Unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused per- 
sons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exer- 
cise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the 
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any state- 
ment he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 
384 U.S. at 444. 
35. Id. 
36. For an intense debate concerning Miranda, see, Marcus and Markman, "The 
Miranda Decision Revisited: Did It Give Criminals Too Many Rights?", 57 U.M.KC. 
L. Rev. 15 (1988). 
37. The Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) held that if the defend- 
ant takes the stand and makes a statement at trial which is inconsistent with the 
earlier statement, that earlier statement can be used to impeach his testimony 
(though not to prove guilt) even though Miranda had not been satisfied. 
38. This "public safety" acception was adopted in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649 (1984). There the defendant had been chased by the police after allegedly com- 
mitting a sexual assault. He was cornered at a supermarket and was asked where 
his gun could be found. His incriminating response was held not to violate Miranda 
because the "threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule 
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 657. 
39. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) where Miranda was held to ap- 
ply to pretrial psychiatric examinations exploring the defendant's competency to 
stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. The United States Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed Miranda in Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989). 
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III. APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF EXCLUSION 
The American exclusionary rules have been the subject of much 
controversy both in the United States and elsewhere. Two impor- 
tant questions have been raised in recent years regarding this con- 
troversy. First, what is the actual impact of the exclusionary rule? 
Second, in what ways has the rule been limited in application? 
A. The Impact 
Exclusionary rules have, undoubtedly, had great impact in many 
ways on the American criminal justice system. The rule of exclu- 
sion stands as an important symbol to both the law enforcement of- 
ficers and the general public that illegal activity by police will not 
benefit law enforcement officials and will result in severe sanction.40 
Moreover, in the several decades since the adoption of the exclusion- 
ary rule, wide-scale funding for police training institutes and educa- 
tion programs have been initiated in order to comply with the 
mandate of the United States Supreme Court and avoid the exclu- 
sion of evidence. 
With respect to the question of the impact in individual cases, 
however, the answer is much less certain. If the question is, does 
the exclusionary rule result in large numbers of serious felony cases 
being dismissed, the answer appears to be no, the impact in this area 
is relatively slight. The leading report was prepared by the Comp- 
troller General of the United States in 1979. In "Impact of the Ex- 
clusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions" the report 
indicated that one out of six defendants filed some type of suppres- 
sion motion but "the overwhelming majority of these motions were 
denied." Indeed, the Comptroller General found that less than one 
percent of "the declined defendants cases were declined due to 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure problems."'41 
If, then, the evidence does not show wide-scale dismissal of 
cases resulting from the exclusionary rule,42 why has the adoption of 
40. Perhaps the best and most thorough treatment of the rules of exclusion is 
Professor Lafave's excellent book, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment (1978). 
41. Letter of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States to Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy, dated April 19, 1979. 
42. See also Nardulli, "The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Visited," 
1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 223, 238-39: 
"The results reported in this article reinforced those reported earlier, and, 
in some respects, go beyond them. Clearly the prominence of the role 
played by the exclusionary rule does not necessarily increase with the size 
of the jurisdiction studied. Despite differences in the mix of the cases, the 
severity of the caseload pressure, and the organization of police forces 
among larger and smaller locales, the exclusionary rule accounts for only a 
minor portion of case attrition." 
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the exclusionary rule been so controversial? Several answers seem 
clear. While the impact may not be widespread, it is present and in 
some cases prosecutions have been dismissed specifically due to the 
application of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, as some argue, the 
exclusionary rule is the wrong remedy to deal with police miscon- 
duct because it results in guilty and dangerous individuals going 
free.43 Finally, it seems clear that one of the key reasons for the 
controversy is that in a small, but highly publicized, number of 
cases, extremely dangerous individuals have had their convictions 
reversed.44 For instance, the defendant in Miranda v. Arizona45 had 
been convicted of kidnapping and rape; the defendant in Brewer v. 
Williams,46 a widely-publicized Sixth Amendment case, had been 
convicted of murder; the defendant in Franks v. Delaware,47 an im- 
portant Fourth Amendment case, had been found guilty of rape, kid- 
napping, and burglary. 
B. Limitations 
Three major limitations have been imposed by the United States 
Supreme Court in connection with rules of exclusion. The first is 
widely used throughout the United States and is known as the doc- 
trine of harmless error. If a violation has occurred under the 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, generally the conviction of 
the defendant is not automatically reversed.48 Instead the question 
becomes whether the court can conclude that the error in admitting 
the evidence which should have been excluded is "harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt." This doctrine has been applied in a host of dif- 
ferent areas relating to Fourth Amendment violations,49 statements 
by co-defendants,50 and comments on the failure of the accused to 
testify.51 As the Supreme Court stated in Chapman v. California: 
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors 
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant 
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal 
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the auto- 
43. See, ? IV infra. 
44. Though the defendants in these cases typically are not set free. They are re- 
quired to stand trial again, with the excluded evidence not part of the government's 
case. 
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
46. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
47. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
48. The major exception is the ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, establishing the 
right to counsel at trial. A violation of this right is held to be prejudicial in all cases. 
49. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
50. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
51. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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matic reversal of the conviction.52 
Another major limitation on the exclusion rules occurs when 
the Supreme Court decides to whom the rules should apply. That is, 
when the Court announces a decision under the Fourth, Fifth or 
Sixth Amendment which would affect rules of exclusion, is the rule 
to be given wholly retroactive application (applicable to all individu- 
als who have ever been involved in that factual situation) or wholly 
prospective application (applicable only to those individuals whose 
cases arise after the date of the Court's decision). If the rules are 
given prospective application only, there is a significant restriction 
on the rules of exclusion. If, however, the rules are given fully ret- 
roactive application, large numbers of individuals whose cases arose 
well before the Court's decision will benefit from it. The general 
rule has been to avoid strict applications of either retroactive or pro- 
spective holdings and instead to resolve the matters on a case-by- 
case basis. The major exception is the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright requiring counsel at trial. That decision was 
given full retroactive application. In other areas, more pertinent to 
the rules of exclusion, the Court has been much more narrowly 
focused. 
In Linkletter v. Walker,53 the United States Supreme Court ap- 
plied the basic exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio to state cases still 
pending on direct appeal at the time the decision was handed down, 
but refused to apply the rule to state convictions which had become 
final prior to the decision. The Court stated its reasoning: 
[In deciding whether to apply a decision retroactively, we 
must look] to the prior history of the rule in question, its 
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation 
will further or retard its operation. [Mapp's] prime purpose 
[was] enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the 
[exclusionary rule]. This, it was found, was the only effec- 
tive deterrent to lawless police action. This purpose [would 
not] be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The 
misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred 
and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners in- 
volved. Nor would it add harmony to the delicate state-fed- 
eral relationship of which we have spoken as part and 
parcel of the purpose of Mapp. Finally, the ruptured pri- 
vacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. 
52. Id. at 22. The Court in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963) said 
that "the question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence com- 
plained of might have contributed to the conviction." See generally United States v. 
Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1988). 
53. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
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Reparation comes too late.54 
Similarly, in Johnson v. New Jersey55 the Court held that the Mi- 
randa decision affected only those cases in which the trial began af- 
ter the date of the decision. Finally, in Desist v. United States m the 
Court found a prior ruling regarding electronic eavesdropping57 
would be given wholly prospective application, applying only to gov- 
ernment activities which occurred after the date of the decision. 
Perhaps the most important, and the most controversial, limita- 
tion on the rules of exclusion has been used in the Fourth Amend- 
ment area. In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided the 
case of United States v. Leon.58 Police officers in that case con- 
ducted a search pursuant to a warrant which had been issued by a 
neutral and detached magistrate. The officers acted in reasonable 
good faith reliance on the warrant but ultimately the courts found 
that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. The question 
in the case was whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
should be modified so that the evidence which had been obtained by 
the officers could be used in the prosecution's case in chief. The 
Court found that if the police officers did act in reasonable good 
faith reliance on a warrant evidence would not be excluded. Look- 
ing heavily to the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule, the 
Court "questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any de- 
terrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively 
reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.59 The Court concluded that if the police officer has 
obtained a search warrant and has acted within its scope, normally 
there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is 
the magistrate's responsiblity to determine whether the of- 
ficer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to is- 
sue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer 
cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable- 
cause determination or his judgment that the form of the 
warrant is technically sufficient. Once the warrant issues, 
there is literally nothing more the policemen can do in 
seeking to comply with the law. Penalizing the officer for 
54. Id. at 629, 636-37. 
55. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
56. 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
57. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1957) the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment application "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical in- 
trusion into any given enclosure" and that electronic eavesdropping upon private 
conversations in a public telephone both constituted a search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 353. 
58. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
59. Id. at 918. 
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the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically 
contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment 
violations.60 
IV. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
For the past 30 years in the United States the rules of exclusion 
in criminal cases have been sharply debated and harshly criticized. 
The primary criticism is one which has existed for decades. Essen- 
tially it is the notion that the exclusionary rule is the wrong mecha- 
nism for dealing with unconstitutional law enforcement techniques. 
Two famous American jurists had widely different views of the mat- 
ter. Justice (then judge) Cardozo noted that the defect with the ex- 
clusionary rule is that "the criminal is to go free because the 
constable has blundered."'61 California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, 
however, took a very different view of the matter, contending that 
this criticism 
is not properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the 
constitutional provisions themselves. It was rejected when 
those provisions were adopted. In such cases had the Con- 
stitution been obeyed, the criminal could in no event be 
convicted. He does not go free because the constable blun- 
dered, but because the Constitutions prohibit securing the 
evidence against him. Their very provisions contemplate 
that it is preferable that some criminals go free than that 
the right of privacy of all the people be set at naught.62 
Moreover, the evidence with respect to the number of criminals go- 
ing free as a result of the exclusionary rule is unclear, at best. 
Contrary to the claims of the rule's critics that exclusion 
leads to "the release of countless guilty criminals," these 
studies have demonstrated that federal and state prosecu- 
tors very rarely drop cases because of potential search and 
60. Id. at 921. The Court did note, however, that reliance on a warrant would 
not always be viewed as satisfying the rules regarding exclusion of evidence. 
"We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases 
where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. Searches 
pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonable- 
ness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that 
a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search. 
Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause deter- 
mination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be 
objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer 
will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly 
issued. 
Id. at 922-23. 
61. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
62. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955). 
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seizure problems.63 
The criticism has also been made that imposing a constitutional 
exclusionary rule on state courts will unduly inhibit the experimen- 
tation of individual states and improperly impact on state-federal re- 
lations. The response has been that a uniform constitutional 
principle under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is 
required in all important criminal procedure matters. Still, the criti- 
cism of Justice Harlan as stated in his dissent in the Mapp case is 
powerful. 
An approach which regards the issue as one of achieving 
procedural symmetry or of serving administrative conven- 
ience surely disfigures the boundaries of this Court's func- 
tion in relation to the state and federal courts. Our role in 
promulgating the [federal rule] was quite a different one 
than it is here. There, in implementing the Fourth Amend- 
ment, we occupied the position of a tribunal having the ulti- 
mate responsibility for developing the standards and 
procedures of judicial administration within the judicial sys- 
tem over which it presides. Here we review state proce- 
dures whose measure it is to be taken not against the 
specific substantive commands of the Fourth Amendment 
but under the flexible contours to the Due Process Clause. 
I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment empowers 
this Court to mold state remedies effectuating the right to 
freedom from "arbitrary intrusion by the police" to suit its 
own notions of how things shold be done....64 
Perhaps the chief criticism directed against the exclusionary 
rule relates to the deterrent impact it has on law enforcement con- 
duct. As one court has noted, "the raison d'etre of the exclusionary 
rule is the deterrence of official misconduct."65 With this viewed by 
some as the only true rationale for the exclusionary rule, the case 
becomes a difficult one to satisfy, as the numerous studies have not 
clearly demonstrated the hoped for impact. As the Supreme Court 
itself noted, 
No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, 
has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether 
the rule has a deterrent effect.66 
Two major responses have been given to the argument that the 
63. United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at 950 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
64. 367 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
65. People v. Cipriano, 429 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Michigan 1988). 
66. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n. 22 (1976). The matter was stated 
forcefully in Allen, "The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and 
the Criminal Cases," 1975 U. Il. L. Forum 518, 537. 
"The reason why the deterrence rationale renders the exclusionary rule 
608 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 38 
exclusionary rule does not deter. The first is the sense as to the ba- 
sis for the rule. That is, there are those who would argue that deter- 
rence is not the only, or even the chief, rationale for the 
exclusionary rule. Indeed, as Justice Brennan once stated, the pur- 
pose of the exclusionary rule is to satisfy "the twin goals of enabling 
the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness 
and of assuring the people . .. that the government would not profit 
from its lawless behavior . .. not the rule's possible deterrent effect 
were uppermost in the minds of the framers of the rule."67 More- 
over, Professor Lafave, the leading American expert on the exclu- 
sionary rule, has pointed out that the difficulty with the deterrence 
argument is how the Court perceives deterrence and applies it in 
this context. 
Surely the question of whether the exclusionary rule did or 
could deter in the particular case is irrelevant, for the 'ex- 
clusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence' but in- 
stead is intended 'to discourage law enforcement officials 
from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the in- 
centive to disregard it.' That is, in the last analysis, deter- 
rence 'is partly a matter of logic and psychology, largely a 
matter of faith. The question is never whether laws do de- 
ter, but rather whether conduct ought to be deterred.'68 
Finally, the argument is made that even if the exclusionary rule 
works as anticipated,69 other alternatives are available which would 
achieve the same result at less cost to society. Two, in particular, 
have been suggested. The first has not been reviewed favorably be- 
cause it calls upon the government to prosecute in criminal actions 
police officers who purposely violate the constitutional rights of in- 
dividuals. As noted more than 40 years ago by Justice Murphy: 
Little need be said concerning the possibilities of criminal 
prosecution. Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation 
reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to 
prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning viola- 
tions of the search and seizure clause during a raid the Dis- 
trct Attorney or his associates have ordered.70 
The principle alternative to the exclusionary rule concerns a 
vulnerable is that the case for the rule as an effective deterrent of police 
misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one." 
67. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) [Brennan, J. dissenting]. 
68. LaFave, "The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal", 32 Vil- 
lanova L. Rev. 1061, 1083 (1987). 
69. Some would argue that it is more than simply effective, it is far too effective 
in terms of the impact on the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Marcus & Markman, 
supra n.36 at 17-18. 
70. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) [Murphy, J., dissenting.] 
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civil action in which the aggrieved party could recover substantial 
damages against law enforcement officials or governmental entites. 
This alternative was put forth by former Chief Justice Burger when 
he encouraged Congress to "develop an administrative or quasi-judi- 
cial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation 
and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have 
been violated."'71 The difficulty with this alternative is that very few 
legislative bodies have taken up the challenge and in fact enacted 
such civil legislative remedies.72 Instead the only true alternative in 
this area has been to rely on traditional civil remedies which have 
worked poorly. 
But there is an appealing ring in another alternative. A 
trespass action for damages is a venable means of securing 
reparation for unauthorized invasion of the home. Why not 
put the old writ to a new use? When the Court cites cases 
permitting the action, the remedy seems complete. 
But what an illusory remedy this is, if by "remedy" we 
mean a positive deterrent to police and prosecutors tempted 
to violate the Fourth Amendment. The appealing ring soft- 
ens when we recall that in a trespass action the measure of 
damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical prop- 
erty. If the officer searches with care, he can avoid all but 
nominal damages - a penny, or a dollar. Are punitive 
damages possible? Perhaps. But a few states permit none, 
whatever the circumstances. In those that do, the plaintiff 
must show the real ill will or malice of the defendant, and 
surely it is not unreasonable to assume that one in honest 
pursuit of crime bears no malice toward the search vic- 
tim. . . . The bad reputation of the plaintiff is likewise 
admissible.73 
V. CONCLUSION 
The exclusionary rule in the United States is seemingly explain- 
able only as a result of great concern regarding government over- 
reaching vis-a-vis individual rights of privacy and liberty. As 
Professor Stepan has well noted, in the first known manual for in- 
terrogators in the 14th century, the Spanish inquisitor Eymericus 
stated: "Non refert quomodo veritas habeatur, dummodo habeatur." 
71. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) [Burger, C.J. 
dissenting]. 
72. But see the strong economic analysis argument in Posner, "Excessive Sanc- 
tions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases," 57 Wash. L. Rev. 635 (1982). 
73. Justice Murphy dissenting in the Wolf case, supra, 338 U.S. at 42-43. He 
went on to note rather dramatically that "there is but one alternative to the rule of 
exclusion. That is no sanction at all." Supra, at 41. 
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Translated, "it does not matter by which methods truth has been ob- 
tained so long as it has been obtained."74 As a result of historical 
and societal views in the United States, however, that point of view 
has been rejected with a vengeance. While there has been wide- 
spread criticism of the exclusionary rule, substantial support for it 
still exists in the United States and it is used throughout the coun- 
try. Perhaps the best explanation for this apparently drastic remedy 
was offered by Justice Clark in the case establishing the exclusion- 
ary rule for unlawful searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio. In re- 
sponse to criticism regarding the harshness of the exclusionary 
doctrine, Clark noted that "there is another consideration - the im- 
perative of judicial integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but 
it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government 
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its 
disregard of the charter of its own existence."75 
The argument was stated forcefully by Justice Frankfurter de- 
cades ago: 
It is vital, no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and 
that all relevant evidence should be secured and used. On 
the other hand, it cannot be said too often that what is in- 
volved far transcends the fate of some sordid offender. 
Nothing less is involved than that which makes for an at- 
mosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repres- 
sion for society as a whole.76 
74. Stepan, "Possible Lessons From Continental Criminal Procedure, in The Eco- 
nomics of Crime and Punishment at 181 [American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, (1973)]. 
75. 367 U.S. at 659. 
76. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947) [Frankfurter, J. dissentingl. 
